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ABSTRACT 
This paper examines the effects of agricultural policy upon the first three 
moments (mean, variance, and skewness) of aggregate farm income distributions. 
For the income variables examined, the program period distributions were 
positively skewed relative to the nonprogram period. However, it appears that 
the significant impact of the programs on risk reduction encourages the asset 
and product markets to shift the distribution of total returns toward asset 
appreciation rather than income enhancement. 
u.s. Agricultural Policy Effectiveness: 
An Analysis of Income and Capital Gain Returns Impacts 
Agricultural economists generally agree that the primary goal of 
agricultural policy since the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933 has been to 
raise farm incomes. A broad spectrum of policies have been implemented to 
achieve that goal. Examples include supply controls, storage subsidies, price 
and income supports, and subsidized credit. While it is likely that 
agricultural policies have succeeded in raising the level of farm income above 
its unregulated level, it is questionable whether such policies have raised 
the rate of return to farm assets. 
Melichar (1984) and Phipps (1985) have argued that government programs 
cannot alter the total rate of return to farm assets. Their arguments are 
based on the assumption that the income-capitalization model determines land 
prices and that the total rate of return is determined by the collective 
product of investor behavior in asset markets. Based on these two 
assumptions, any increase in the level of farm income will be capitalized into 
the value of farm assets to the point where the rate of return on farm assets 
is unchanged. However, farm programs can alter the composition of the total 
return to farm assets, which is divided between an income and capital gains 
return. An example will help illustrate this effect. First, note that the 
capital gain return is equal to the rate of growth in the income return. 
Initially, assume the equilibrium total return is 4 percent and is composed of 
0 percent capital gains and 4 percent income returns. Next, assume the 
government supports the level of income such that it grows 1 percent per year. 
This translates into a 1 percent capital gains return per year. If the market 
determined total return remains 4 percent, then income return must fall to 3 
percent. Therefore, by increasing the level of farm income the income rate of 
return in fact may be reduced. 
The above example is revealing conceptually, but is difficult to apply in 
reality. The reason is that government programs likely effect the shape of 
the entire distribution of returns, not simply the mean as was implicitly 
assumed. More specifically, policies such as price and inco~e supports are 
likely to truncate at least the lower portion of the expected income return to 
farm assets. This may result in a complex change in at least the mean, 
variance, and skewness of the realized distribution as producers change their 
optimal production plans in response to the changed expectation of returns. 
The previous discussion suggests the effect of government intervention in 
agricultural markets is reflected in changes in all moments of the 
distribution of returns to farm assets. We will examine this effect by 
comparing the first three moments (mean, variance, and skewness) of aggregate 
rates of return to farm assets previous to 1933 and after 1933. This 
particular period, concerning u.s. agricultural policy, marked the beginning 
of what now has been five decades of federal government intervention in 
agricultural markets. The first three moments are argued to be representative 
of the most important and economically meaningful effects. The results of the 
analysis should prove valuable to the debate concerning the effectiveness of 
farm programs. Following sections discuss utility maximization under 
uncertainty, procedures, results, and conclusions and implications. 
THEORY 
Farm programs were enacted to improve producers' income and economic well 
being. Therefore, to analyze the impacts of farm policy upon the rate of 
return on aggregate farm income, changes in producers' expected utility are 
examined. Traditionally, policy analysts have utilized the first two moments 
of farm income in producers' utility functions as a measure of policy 
effectiveness. But, as mentioned above, government policy affects more than 
the first two moments, it also changes the third moment of the distribution. 
Following is a brief discussion of producers' expected utility utilizing 
higher order utility functions which incorporate the first three moments. 
An individual facing economic uncertainty (risk) will maximize his 
expected utility (U) generated from all activities entered. Utility (U) is 
defined to be a function of income (I) and is specified by: 
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where equation (2) follows from equation (1) by virtue of the expected utility 
theorem and h(I) is the probability distribution of income. 
Taking the expectation of a Taylor series expansion of the utility 
function, the expected utility function (3) can be expressed as a function of 
the moments of the income distribution. Thus, 
where Mk(I) represents the kth moment of the income distribution and 
therefore, 
5) U(I) • f[E(I), V(I), S(I), ••• ] 
where E(I), V(I), and S(I) respectively denote the mean, variance, and 
skewness of the income distribution. The mean represents the expected return 
while variance and skewness measure the relative riskiness of returns. 
Arrow states that the desirable properties for an individual's utility 
function are: 
1) positive marginal utility for income, U'(I)>O; 
2) decreasing marginal utility of income, U''(I)<O; 
3) non-decreasing absolute risk aversion, r'(I)<O 
where r(I) = -[U''/U']. 
Arditti has shown that Arrow's condition (3) is a sufficient condition 
for U'''(I)>O, implying individual preference for positive skewness. For 
individuals with long term investment horizons, skewness becomes a relevant 
variable in their decision making criteria (Arditti and Levy). Risk averse 
individuals prefer positive skewness and dislike negative skewness (Anderson, 
Dillon, and Hardaker). 
PROCEDURES 
To examine policy effectiveness of federal government farm programs, 
aggregate farm income data from 1910 to 1985 are utilized (Melichar, 1986). 
These data series consist of income from all farm sources and have been 
converted to 1985 dollars using the Personal Consumption Expenditure (PCE) 
deflator. Income measures examined consist of income earned, real capital 
gains, and total returns on assets. 
Melichar derived much of these income series from USDA sources, but did 
reconstruct one series. Consequently, income earned on assets differs from 
its USDA counterpart. In essence, in these data income earned on assets is 
gross income less operating expenses, capital consumption, and imputed labor 
costs. 
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The rates of return to assets were analyzed for two periods: 1910 to 
1932, inclusive and 1933 to 1985, inclusive. Rates of return to assets were 
used to eliminate the scale effect of a growth in asset values. The period of 
1910-1932 represents the period of limited and inconsistent government 
involvement, while 1933-1985 represents the era of government interventions. 
Policy effectiveness is examined by identifying differences in the first three 
moments (mean, variance, and skewness) of the three rate of return variables 
between the two periods. Clearly, other factors may have caused the changes, 
if any, in the distribution of returns after 1933. Possibilities include a 
change in investor preferences either in general or in the farm sector, the 
changed structure of farming, and increasing macroeconomic intervention by the 
government. We recognize the caution this suggests in interpreting the 
results. 
The statistical tests included comparison of the sample mean, variance, 
and relative skewness between periods for each income variable. To 
statistically infer differences between the first two moments for the two 
periods, t and F tests were conducted on the sample means and variances, 
respectively, at the 95 percent confidence level. A standardized relative 
skewness for each income distribution for the two periods was also calculated 
and tested at the 95 percent confidence level. 
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RESULTS 
The results show that federal farm programs have apparently benefited the 
aggregate agricultural sector. Increased expected producer utilities should 
have resulted from changes in the first three moments that occurred in ~he 
program period, 1933-1985. For all three variables investigated, the 1933-
1985 income distribution shifted to the right relative to the 1910-1932 
distribution. Alternatively, the 1933-1985 period distribution was either 
less skewed to the left, normal, or skewed right relative to the 1910-1932 
period distribution. The statistical results for income, capital gains, and 
total returns are presented in Table 1. Figures 1, 2, and 3 illustrate the 
changes in distributions of the three variables between the two periods. 
The mean ROR (rate of return) of income earned on assets is statistically 
higher for the nonprogram period although the variances are not significantly 
different. The nonprogram period averaged slightly over 4 percent while the 
program period averaged 3.2 percent. The program period distribution is 
skewed to the right while the nonprogram is normally distributed. Figures la 
and 1b show that the program period distribution is skewed to the right 
relative to the nonprogram period. Thus, with respect to income earned 4n 
assets the evidence on the impact of the post 1933 programs on producers' 
expected utility is inconclusive. Only the third moment (skewness) clearly 
moved in the desired direction. 
The ROR (rate of return) of real capital gains on assets for the 1933-
1985 period averaged 1.0 percent and is significantly greater than the 1910-
1932 period at -2.13 percent. Both periods real capital gains are negatively 
skewed, but the program period is relatively less negatively skewed than the 
nonprogram period. Figures 2a and 2b depict this change in capital gains. 
Thus, the expected utility of producers as measured by real capital gains was 
improved as a result of federal farm programs. That is, both the mean (first 
moment of the producers' utility function) and the skewness (third moment) 
shifted significantly to the right while there was no significant change in 
the variances (second moment). 
The ROR of total returns to assets for the 1933-1985 period averaged 4.19 
percent and is statistically greater than the 1910-1932 period at 1.96 
percent. The variances are not significantly different however, the post 
policy period distribution is normally distributed while the pre-policy period 
is skewed left. Figures 3a and 3b illustrate these changes in total returns 
on assets. 
One should exercise caution in the interpretation of these results. The 
period of analysis, 1910 to 1985, presents some data limitations. The pre and 
post 1933 per±ods"'may not, be comparable due in part to the differences in 
sample size. Both periods were also characterized by some rather dramatic 
economic events which may bias the capital gain and total returns comparisons. 
TABLE 1. Statistical Summary of Rates of Return to Assets. 
(Shown in Percentages) 
Net Real Capital 
Period Income Gains 
1910 to mean 4.09 -2.13 
1932 variance 5.21 17.60 
relative skewness1 0.335 -1.09 
skewness type normal left 
1933 to mean 3.20 1.00 
1985 variance 3.13 24.93 
relative skewness 1.258 -0.99 
skewness type right left 
means < = > 2 c a 
variances < = > b b 
Total 
Return 
1.96 
25.21 
-1.20 
left 
4.19 
30.00 
-0.43 
normal 
a 
b 
1 The critical value for relative skewness is the skewness value divided by 
the standard deviation for relative skewness. The standard deviation for 
relative skewness is the square root of (6/n). 
2 a = 1933-1985 ) 1910-1932 
b = 1933-1985 = 1910-1932 
c = 1910-1932 > 1933-1985 
One-side t-statistics test at the 95 percent confidence level. 
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Figure la. Frequency Distribution of the Rate of Return 
of Income Earned on Assets, 1910 to 1932. 
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Figure lb. Frequency Distribution of the Rate of Return 
of Income Earned on Assets, 1933 to 1985. 
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Figure 2a. Frequency Distribution of Real Capital Gains 
on Assets, 1910 to 1932. 
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Figure 2b. Frequency Distribution of Real Capital Gains 
on Assets, 1933 to 1985. 
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Figure 3a. Frequency Distribution of Total Returns 
to Assets, 1910 to 1932. 
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Figure 3b. Frequency Distribution of Total Returns 
to Assets, 1933 to 1985. 
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CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS 
Imposition of government farm programs, such as price and income support 
provisions for selected agricultural commodities, have been justified at least 
politically on the basis of the rationale that agricultural producers are 
better off as a result of these programs. However, it has been frequently 
observed that much of the gain to farm operative incomes have been cap~talized 
into asset values, particularly farmland. 
In this analysis, it has been argued that changes in producers' expected 
utility from economic gains associated with these programs is a relevant 
measure of program success. Contrary to traditional utility analysis which 
concentrates on the first two moments, mean and variance, this analysis has 
incorporated the third moment, skewness. Because one objective of faun 
programs has been to limit down-side price and/or income risk to producers, it 
is argued that a shift in skewness in the distribution of economic gains over 
time from the left to the right is a meaningful measure of program 
effectiveness. Such a shift is also consistent with the expected ut~lity of 
risk-averse producers. 
Three measures of economic gains were examined: (1) income earned, 
measured in terms of return on assets, (2) the rate of real capital 
appreciation, and (3) total return on assets. The first is representative of 
an income flow to farm operators; the second of gains that flow to landowners. 
Thus, the impacts of post 1933 government programs on operating income, 
capitalized asset values, and total returns were examined in the context of 
the first three moments of expected producer utility. 
The results showed that, in terms of the second moment, variance, there 
were no statistically significant changes caused in each measure of economic 
gain by the imposition of post 1933 government farm programs. In terms of the 
third moment, skewness, there were statistically significant improvements in 
all three variables. Regarding the first moment, income, there was a 
statistically significant decrease for the income measure and a statistically 
significant increase in the asset value measure and total returns. 
Overall, therefore, for five of the nine possible outcomes, changes 
occurred that are all indicative of an increase in expected producer utility 
as a result of the post 1933 programs while one outcome was indicative of a 
decrease (mean value of earned income) and the remaining three outcomes showed 
no significant differences between the pre and post 1933 periods. These 
results were fully consistent with the generally received view that economic 
gains associated with the post 1933 programs have been capitalized into asset 
(land) values rather than in increased operating incomes. 
Indeed, operating incomes on average appear to have declined as a result of 
the post 1933 programs. The question is, was the increase in capital gains 
and total returns concurrent with shifts in income, capital gains, and total 
return skewness to the right sufficient to compensate producers for the lower 
income stream? While the evidence is not conclusive, these results suggest 
that the answer is yes: five of nine elements affecting expected producers• 
utility were improved, three were essentially unchanged and only one 
decreased. In essence, it appears that the significant impact of these 
programs on risk reduction (shifting skewness to the right) encourages the 
asset and product markets to shift the distribution of total returns toward 
asset appreciation rather than income enhancement. This is to say, risk-
reduction policies are differentially beneficial to asset owners. 
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Finally, caution must be exercised in the interpretation of these results. 
First, the pre and post 1933 period data is characterized by some dramatic 
economic events and differing sample sizes. Secondly, other factors, such as 
changing preferences of investors, may also have contributed to the observed 
changes in the distribution of returns to farm assets. 
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